We compare different epistemic notions in the presence of awareness of propositional variables: the logics of implicit knowledge (in which explicit knowledge is definable), explicit knowledge, and speculative knowledge. Different notions of bisimulation are suitable for these logics. We provide correspondence between bisimulation and modal equivalence on image-finite models for these logics. The logic of speculative knowledge is equally expressive as the logic of explicit knowledge, and the logic of implicit knowledge is more expressive than both. We also provide axiomatizations for the three logics -only the one for speculative knowledge is novel. Then we move to the study of dynamics by recalling action models incorporating awareness. We show that any conceivable change of knowledge or awareness can be modelled in this setting, we give a complete axiomatization for the dynamic logic of implicit knowledge. The dynamic versions of all three logics are, surprising, equally expressive.
INTRODUCTION
Motivating example. Explicit knowledge is often defined as implicit knowledge plus awareness, with implicit knowledge given by the standard modal box [4, 9] . Thus, to express that 'agent i knows ϕ explicitly', K E i ϕ, we use formulas of the form 2iϕ ∧ Aiϕ. In such frameworks, awareness is typically modelled as a function A that indicates the set of formulas each agent is aware of at each state; hence, Aiϕ is true at state s iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s). When the agents' awareness consists of all formulas built from a subset of atoms (the so-called propositional awareness), we can simply associate with a formula ϕ the set of atoms Q ⊆ P occurring in ϕ, and we can then say that Aiϕ is true at state s iff Q ⊆ Ai (s) .
This definition of explicit knowledge can lead to counter- intuitive situations. Consider the following models.
M :
Model M has a domain {s, t, u}, a single agent i with accessibility relation R = {(s, t), (t, u)}, atom p true in all states, and the agent is aware of p only in state s. Awareness is not depicted. Model M is like M , except that p is now false in u (the black dot).
As mentioned, the agent knows explicitly a given ϕ at a given state iff she is aware of the formula in that state and ϕ is true in all accessible states. Let us apply this to the depicted structures. In both, the agent is unaware of p at state t, and therefore of the value of p in u: she should see (M, t) and (M , t) as identical, and therefore (M, s) and (M , s) as well. We propose a notion of bisimilarity for which (M, s) and (M , s) are bisimilar. Now here is the surprise: in the language with awareness and modal box, states (M, s) and (M , s) are not modally equivalent. Given explicit knowledge K E i ϕ as 2iϕ ∧ Aiϕ, consider K E i 2ip. This is true in (M, s) but false in (M , s). In logics of awareness [4] it is common only to consider models for knowledge (equivalence relations) and belief. However, as always in multi-agent logics, it is elementary to transform a single-agent model with directed (asymmetric) accessibility into a multi-agent model where intersecting equivalence classes for agents force such asymmetry. For example, consider the following.
T :
Models T and T have equivalence accessibility relations (a line represents a two-directions arrow, with reflexive and transitive arrows omitted) for agents i and j. Agent i is aware of p in the states w, and unaware of p in every other state; agent j is unaware of p in every state. The only difference between T and T is that p is true at (T, u) and false in (T , u) . Again, intuitively, these models are the same from agent i's perspective. But K E i 2j2ip is true above and false below.
The problem here is the presence of the 2. If the K E operator is not defined by abbreviation but a primitive in the language, then the models cannot be distinguished, as we will prove. Explicit possibility L E seems another desirable primitive, as it is not the dual of explicit knowledge (both require awareness). This led us to the comparison of logics where different epistemic notions are primitive. Instead of K E and L E as primitives, it turns out that we can equally well take K E and A (awareness) as primitive, and this language then contrasts nicely with the initial one with 2 and A as primitives. A third epistemic notion is also in our focus: speculative knowledge K S [20, 21] , and with that, the language with K S and A. An agent i speculatively knows ϕ, K S i ϕ, if in any i-accessible state, in any state indistinguishable from that as far as awareness of i is concerned, ϕ is true. This is exactly the sense in which (M, s) and (M , s ), or (T, w) and (T , w), are similar for i.
Our results. This paper addresses the question of what
a proper notion of knowledge should be in the presence of awareness, and what the proper notion of bisimulation should be in structures encoding knowledge and awareness; how these choices interact; and how adding dynamics of knowledge and awareness further affects this. We present two notions of bisimulation for the Fagin and Halpern structures of [4] , standard bisimulation and awareness bisimulation; and we present three logics, all in the presence of operators Aiϕ for awareness of variables occurring in ϕ: the logic of implicit knowledge (with 2i, so that K E i is definable), the logic of explicit knowledge (with K E i ), and the logic of speculative knowledge (with K S i ), summarily introduced above as knowledge modulo speculation over unaware variables. We then show that, on image-finite models, standard bisimilarity corresponds to modal equivalence in the logic of implicit knowledge, but that awareness bisimilarity corresponds to modal equivalence in the logic of explicit knowledge, and also to modal equivalence in the logic of speculative knowledge. We continue by listing various expressivity results, mainly that the logic of implicit knowledge is (strictly) more expressive than the logic of explicit knowledge (reminiscent of [9] ). After that we give axiomatizations for our three logics. The logic of implicit knowledge was already axiomatized in [4] and the logic of explicit knowledge in [9] , but the axiomatization for the logic of speculative knowledge is novel. Then we investigate the dynamics of awareness and of knowledge, by way of epistemic awareness action models. The dynamic logic of speculative knowledge has already been reported in [22] . Here, we show that on the class of finite models every conceivable change of (implicit, explicit, or speculative) knowledge or awareness can be modelled in an epistemic awareness action model. Finally, we give a complete axiomatization for the dynamic logic of implicit knowledge. The dynamic versions of the logics are, surprising, equally expressive. This also gives us the axiomatization for the dynamic logic of explicit knowledge.
Overview of the literature. Our work is rooted in the tradition of epistemic logic [13] and in particular multi-agent epistemic logic [15, 5] , in various works on the interaction between awareness and knowledge [4, 16, 9, 11, 12, 8, 10] , and in modal logical research in propositional quantification, starting with [6] and followed up by work on bisimulation quantifiers [24, 14, 7] .
Works treating awareness either follow a more semantically flavoured approach, where awareness is defined in terms of a set of propositional variables [17, 11] , or a more syntactically flavoured approach, where awareness concerns all formulas of the language in a given set, in order to model 'limited rationality' of agents [4, 19] . Our proposal falls straight into the semantic corner: within the limits of their awareness, agents are fully rational.
LOGICS FOR AWARENESS
Throughout the contribution, given are a countable nonempty set of atomic propositions P and a (disjoint) finite non-empty set of agents N .
Definition 1 (Epistemic awareness model) An epistemic awareness model is a tuple
A pair (M, s) with s ∈ S is an epistemic awareness state.
We write Ri for R(i), Ai for A(i), and Ri(s) for {t ∈ S | Ri(s, t)}. An epistemic awareness model is image-finite if all Ri(s) are finite.
An epistemic awareness model is simply an epistemic model plus a propositional awareness function. We associate two notions of bisimulation [18, 3] with this. Standard bisimulation is the more obvious one, but awareness bisimulation is evidently the more suitable notion in view of our introductory examples. The motivation for awareness bisimulation was the lattice of state spaces in [11] ; see [20, 21] for details.
Definition 2 (Standard bisimulation)
, for every agent i ∈ N , and for every p ∈ Q:
Definition 3 (Awareness bisimulation) As Definition 2 but with the following clauses for forth and back instead.
• forth:
where
In an awareness bisimulation, the perspective of the agent is restricted to the variables that she is aware of, therefore in the back and forth steps bisimulation is only checked for the variables in Q ∩ Ai(s) instead of the variables in Q. The following is therefore obvious. (M, s) and (M , s ) be epistemic awareness models, and 
Proposition 4 Let
is defined as follows, where p ∈ P and i ∈ N .
Given a language L, L|Q is the language with the propositional variables restricted to Q ⊆ P .
We typically consider languages for subsets of these inductive rules. We write
, as these three languages are the main focus of our investigations. We assume familiarity with the meaning of propositional constructs, the modal box, and awareness. Implication →, disjunction ∨, equivalence ↔, and the modal diamond 3i are defined by abbreviation, as usual. Formula 2iϕ sometimes stands for 'the agent implicitly knows ϕ', but we also view it as a mere technical background notion. Formula K 
. Speculative knowledge is defined in terms of awareness bisimulation: agent i knows speculatively ϕ at (M, s) iff ϕ is the case in every epistemic awareness state that is Ai(s) awareness bisimilar to some state t accessible from s in M .
Speculative and explicit knowledge are different. For example, any agent knows p ∨ ¬p speculatively, even if she is unaware of p, because in every possible state p ∨ ¬p is true. Nevertheless, the agent only knows p ∨ ¬p explicitly when she is aware of p.
Speculative and implicit knowledge are also different. The agent may implicitly know p, but she cannot speculatively know that, because she can speculate about p being false. And if p were false, she cannot know that p.
More convincing examples of speculative knowledge involve dynamics. Suppose that the agent explicitly knows q but is unaware of p. She then speculatively knows: "If p is false then even if I were to become aware of p I cannot explicitly know that p and q are both true." (In the extended logic of Section 7 this is formally ¬p
] is a dynamic modal operator.) But she does not explicitly know that, because she is unaware of p, and p occurs in the formula. For more intuitions, see [20, 21, 22] .
Definition 8 (Modal equivalence) Awareness epistemic states (M, s) and
we write for that, respectively, ≡ 
BISIMILARITY AND MODAL EQUIVA-LENCE
For the logic of implicit knowledge we have, as expected, that standard bisimilarity implies modal equivalence in L 2 . Moreover, in the class of image-finite models, modal equivalence in L 2 implies standard bisimilarity. (Let (M, s) and (M , s ) be epistemic awareness models, and Q ⊆ P ...)
Proof. The proof is standard, by induction on ϕ. The case for formulas of the form Aiϕ follows from the aware clause in Definition 2.
Proposition 10 On image-finite models:
Proof. Again, the proof is standard. For proving the aware clause, we use modal equivalence with respect to formulas of the form Aiϕ.
Theorem 11 On image-finite models:
For the logic of explicit knowledge the correspondence is between awareness bisimulation and modal equivalence in L E . We recall that awareness bisimulation is a weaker notion than standard bisimulation.
Proposition 12
Proof. We show the following:
In this formulation it is important that ϕ is chosen before Q, and both ϕ and Q before the models, so that the inductive hypothesis may be used on a subformula of ϕ for another subset of P than the initial Q (and for any models). Again, the proof goes by induction on ϕ; all cases are trivial except
, and then we can use induction hypothesis to get (M , t ) |= ϕ. Thus, every ele-
The other direction is similar.
Proposition 13 On image-finite models:
Proof. We will show that the relation of modal equivalence in L E with formulas built from atoms in Q is a Q awareness bisimulation, i.e., that ≡ E Q satisfies Definition 3.
• Aware. Take any i ∈ N , and suppose p ∈ Q∩Ai(s); then p ∈ Q and p ∈ Ai(s). From the latter we get (M, s) |= Aip and therefore (M , s ) |= Aip, that is, p ∈ A i (s ). We already had p ∈ Q, so p ∈ Q ∩ A i (s ). The other direction is similar. • Forth. Take any i ∈ N , and suppose t ∈ Ri(s); we want to find a t
We proceed by contradiction, so suppose no element of R i (s ) is modally equivalent to t with respect to formulas in
is a finite non-empty set: finite because of image-finiteness, and non-empty because Ri(s) = ∅ iff (M, s) |= Li , and since Li ∈ L E |Q, we should have (M , s ) |= Li too. Now, since no element of R i (s ) is modally equivalent to t with respect to formulas with atoms in Q ∩ Ai(s), then for each t k ∈ R i (s ) there should be a formula ϕk ∈ L E |(Q ∩ Ai(s)) that holds at t but fails at t k . Now define ϕ := ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn (with n the cardinality of R i (s )). We have (M, t) |= ϕ because every ϕk is true at t, but also (M , t k ) |= ϕ for every k because each ϕk fails in at least
• Back. Similar to the forth clause. That the language L 2 of implicit knowledge is aligned with standard bisimulation rather than awareness bisimulation can be seen as a strong argument against the use of this language to specify interactions in epistemic awareness models: it is too rich from the point of view of an agent reasoning about its knowledge and awareness. The language of explicit knowledge L E can be seen as its 'explicit' counterpart. Without the aspect of awareness, L 2 is nothing but the standard multiagent epistemic language, built from the propositional connectives plus operators to talk about what the agent knows and considers possible. Similarly, language L E can be seen as (relative to an expressivity result proved in Section 5) built from propositional connectives plus operators to talk about what the agent explicitly knows and explicitly considers possible.
Theorem 14 On image-finite models:
(M, s) ↔ Q(M , s ) iff (M, s) ≡ E Q (M , s ).
Example 3 The formula K
Finally, speculative knowledge. Interestingly, modal equivalence in L S for the logic of speculative knowledge is also characterized (on image-finite models) by awareness bisimulation.
Proposition 15
Proof. See [21, 22] . 
Proposition 16 On image-finite models:
(M, s) ≡ S Q (M , s ) implies (M, s) ↔ Q(M , s ). Proof. Assume (M, s) ≡ S Q (M ,i-accessible state from s, namely t, and a Q ∩Ai(s) awareness bisimilar state equivalent to (M, t), namely (M, t) it- self, such that (M, t) |= ψ. (From (M, t) ≡ Q∩A i (s) (M, t)
Theorem 17
On image-finite models:
HAVING THE SAME KNOWLEDGE
We can now harvest the benefits from the previous section. We want to characterize when two epistemic awareness states are the same 'from the perspective of an agent', that is, when the agent's knowledge and ignorance is the same in both. This is weaker than being modally equivalent: two epistemic awareness states (M, s) and (M , s ) that differ only in a propositional variable p look the same for an agent that is not aware of p in both, and they also look the same for an agent that is aware of p in both but such that the actual state is not accessible. The results for implicit, explicit and speculative knowledge are similar. 
• (M, s) and (M , s ) describe the same explicit knowledge up to Q for the agents in N iff, for every agent
• (M, s) and (M , s ) describe the same speculative knowledge up to Q for the agents in N iff, for every agent To define the same explicit knowledge, we need to refer to both K E and L E in the definition (both require awareness). For implicit knowledge and for speculative knowledge the part for the dual diamond version is simply the contraposition of the part for the box version. The 'at least' bit in the final part of the definition is there, because agent i does not explicitly know any formula with variables in Q \ Ai(s), both in s and s .
Write
except for the valuation of atoms in s and s (i.e., skip clause atoms in the root), and except for back and forth for all other agents than i, in the root. Then this ↔ i equivalence class encodes exactly 'what agent i knows in state s'. This works both for explicit knowledge and for speculative knowledge (for implicit knowledge we would require standard bisimulation, but we consider that case of lesser interest).
Proposition 19 Let (M, s) and (M , s ) be image-finite epistemic awareness models, and i
Proof. Directly from Theorem 14, resp., Theorem 17.
This structural characterization of explicit knowledge and speculative knowledge, for a given agent, was an important motivation for our investigation.
EXPRESSIVITY
Two models (M, s) and (M , s ) can be distinguished in language L of logic L if there is formula ϕ ∈ L that is false in (M, s) and true in (M , s ) ; ϕ is called a distinguishing formula. A logic L with language L is at least as expressive as L with language L if all pairs of models distinguishable in L are also distinguishable in L. A standard way to prove this, is to show that any formula in L is equivalent to a formula in L (and a trivial case is when L ⊆ L), and a standard way to disprove it is to show that some pair of models distinguishable in L is indistinguishable in L. A logic L is (strictly) more expressive than a language L , given a class of models, if L is at least as expressive as L but not vice versa. Instead of expressivity of logics one sometimes talks about the expressivity of languages. The latter is then, of course, relative to a semantics, i.e., it concerns after all a logic.
The expressivity hierarchy is a partial order <. We are interested in the relative expressivity of our main logics L 2 , L E , and L S . This is a total order:
Both terms in the equation are of interest. For example, L
E and L S could just as well have been incomparable. Of further interest is that a number of other logics are equally expressive as L 2 . As we have a good naming device for languages but not for logics we will henceforth in this section talk about expressivity of languages, not logics, and we will write all languages in full, e.g., L(2, A) instead of L 2 , etc.
Proposition 20 (Equivalence class of
Proof. This follows from the following equivalences:
Proof. Consider the models (M, s) and (M, s ) of the first introductory example. We have seen that they are {p} awareness bisimilar, and thus by Proposition 12 modally equivalent in L(K E , A). On the other hand, K
E i 2ip ∈ L(2, A) distinguishes between the two models. Hence, L(2, A) is more expressive than L(K E , A).

Proposition 23 (Equivalence class of
The following obvious (recursive) definitions are sufficient for this. A) , we require the concept of a uniform interpolant [24] . It has been shown that the modal logic K has the uniform interpolation property, that is, if there is a formula ϕ whose variables are taken from the union of the disjoint sets of atoms Q and R, then there is a single formula ϕ Q such that
2. the validity of ϕ → γ implies the validity of ϕ Q → γ for all formulae γ not containing any atoms from R.
This allows us to define a recursive translation (relative to the set Q of propositional atoms the agent is aware of):
The proof of Prop. 23 required the presence of the awareness operator in
, given Prop. 21). As speculative knowledge treats unaware atoms as their most general consistent interpretation, there is no semantic difference (with respect to just speculative knowledge) between an agent being unaware of an atom and an agent (speculatively) knowing nothing about it.
The lower end of this expressivity hierarchy is also of theoretical interest but maybe less of practical interest. We have various other results, that are given here without proof.
Clearly the propositional language L(∅) is less expressive than all of
L(K E ), L(L E ), L(2
), and L(K S ). More interesting is that, although we already established that L(K
and L(K S ) are incomparable. And so on . . .
AXIOMATIZATION
In this section we present complete axiomatizations for our logics. Table 1 presents an axiomatization L 2 characterizing the validities of the language L 2 in epistemic awareness models (the logic L 2 ). This axiomatization is provided in [4] , modulo a minor variation (see Section 8). Proof. Soundness is proved by showing that axioms in L 2 are valid and that its rules preserve validity. Completeness is proved by using the canonical model technique in the standard way. Table 2 presents an axiomatization L E characterizing the validities of the language L E in epistemic awareness models. A similar axiomatization, but with a different completeness proof, was provided in [9] . See again Section 8 for further discussion.
All propositional tautologies
Ai Ai¬ϕ ↔ Aiϕ 2i(ϕ → ψ) → (2iϕ → 2iψ) Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ Aiϕ ∧ Aiψ From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ Ai2jϕ ↔ Aiϕ From ϕ infer 2iϕ A iAj ϕ ↔ Aiϕ
Ai Table 3 presents an axiomatization L S characterizing the validities of the language L S in epistemic awareness models. In axiom * of Table 3 , called KS, it is required that p ∈ v (ϕ).
Ai Table 3 : Axiom system L S Since the axiomatization for the logic of speculative knowledge is novel, we provide the results in detail.
Theorem 26 (Soundness) Every theorem of L S is valid.
Proof. This is a quite standard proof, and we only need to examine the axioms and rules involving speculative knowledge. Axiom
and the rule of necessitation for K S are straightforward, and are also found in [21] .
Axiom KS is new. It says that if an agent speculatively knows a formula despite the formula using an atom of which the agent is unaware, then the agent would continue to know that formula if the atom were replaced with any other formula. This axiom captures the intuition of the speculative knowledge operator, where if an agent is unaware of an atom, the agent must assume the most general interpretation of that atom. In other words, this is according to the semantics for speculative knowledge.
To prove completeness, we use the canonical model technique.
Definition 27 (Canonical model) The canonical model for
L S is a tuple M c = (S c , R c , A c , V c ) where
• S c is the set of all theories (maximal consistent sets) of
7. DYNAMICS
Epistemic awareness action models
Epistemic awareness models represent the information of agents who may be uncertain about the truth of some propositional variables and unaware of others. The information of such agents can change via informational acts. Epistemic awareness action models represent awareness change and knowledge change. They were introduced in [22] for the logic of speculative knowledge. The definition adds a component for awareness to the action models of [1] (and a component for postconditions, as in [23] ).
Definition 32 (Epistemic awareness action model)
An epistemic awareness action model is a tuple M = (S, R, A, pre, post) where
• S is a non-empty set of actions; • R : N → P(S × S) is an accessibility function;
• A : {+, −} → N → S → P(P ) is an awareness change function, indicating the disjoint sets of atoms each agent i ∈ N will become aware (+) and unaware of (-) after the execution of s ∈ S; • pre : S → L is a precondition function specifying, for each action s ∈ S, the requirement for its execution;
ing, for each action in s ∈ S, how the truth value of each atomic proposition p ∈ P will change.
A pair (M, s) with s ∈ S is an epistemic awareness action.
The language L of the preconditions and postconditions is a fixed parameter of this definition. We write A 
The new set of states is the restricted cartesian product of S and S: a pair (s, s) is a state in the new model iff s satisfies s's precondition in M . Since the precondition is a formula of a language L, we assume a satisfiability relation |= that evaluates it. For the accessibility relation of the new model, we combine the accessibility relation of the 'static' model and the 'action' model: a state (s ,
Language and semantics
Instead of interpreting action models relative to a given logical language, we can also consider the set of action model frames as an additional parameter in an inductively defined language with a clause [M, s]ϕ (where the precondition of actions should be lower in the inductive hierarchy); this stands for 'after execution of (M, s), ϕ (is true)'. 
Definition 34 (Language) The language L(⊗) extends any L with an additional inductive clause [M, s]ϕ, where (M, s) is an epistemic awareness action satisfying that: its domain is finite, the postcondition function changes the valuation of only a finite number of atomic propositions, and the awareness function returns two finite sets of atomic propositions
. For L(2, A, ⊗) we write L 2⊗ , for L(K E , A, ⊗) we write L E⊗ , and L(K S , A, ⊗) we write L S⊗ .
Definition 35 (Free variables)
An additional inductive clause v ([M, s]ϕ) is defined as v (ϕ)∪ t∈D(M) v (pre(t))∪ t∈D(M),p∈A + i (t)∪A − i (t) (p∪v (post(t)(p)))(M, s) |= [M, s]ϕ iff (M, s) |= pre(s) ⇒ (M ⊗ M, (s, s)) |= ϕ
Proposition 37 Let
Proof. The proof is very similar to that in [22] for speculative knowledge. (Theorem 8 in [22] contains an error. It is here corrected.) The difference between implicit, speculative and explicit knowledge plays no role in the inductive case for action models. We only show that case.
Inductive case [M, s]ϕ:
is (standard) bisimulation preserving [1] ; an easily observable fact when one realizes that pairs in the new accessibility relation require the first argument to be in the accessibility relation in the original model (given (t, t ) ∈ R[Q], the induced bisimulation R [Q] on the product is defined as ((t, t), (t , t)) ∈ R [Q]). We now also have to satisfy the aware requirement. In the model M ⊗ M the level of awareness Ai(t, t) is a function of the prior level of awareness Ai(t) in t and the added or deleted propositional variables A + i (t) and A − i (t). As the prior awareness Ai(t) is the same in any Q awareness bisimilar state t , and the added or deleted atoms are also the same, the posterior awareness must therefore also be the same for any pairs (t, t) and (t , t) in the Q awareness bisimulation. Therefore, , (s , s) ). Now using induction again, we conclude (M ⊗ M, (s , s)) |= ϕ, and from that and
Given the variety of knowledge and awareness changes that can be modelled by epistemic awareness action models, as shown in Example 4, the following is an important theorem. It demonstrates the adequacy of the framework.
Theorem 38 Let (M, s) and (M , s ) be finite epistemic awareness states. Then there is an epistemic awareness action
Proof. The proof is an extension of the one in [23] . We sketch the proof. First, delete the structure of (M, s) by a public announcement of its characteristic formula (as M is finite, this characteristic formula exists [2] ). The result is a singleton epistemic awareness state consisting of s only. It does not matter what the valuation is or the level of awareness because, next, we execute an epistemic awareness action with precondition true and with the exact structure of the target model (M , s ), using postconditions in actions instead of valuations in states (setting then the value of propositional variables to the value of the valuation in the corresponding state), and awareness change function in actions instead of awareness functions in states (setting then the level of awareness of propositional variables to that in the corresponding state). This last part on awareness is the extension with respect to [23] .
An alternative construction is the straightforward execution in (M, s) of an epistemic awareness action with the structure of the target model (M , s ), and then the result is an epistemic awareness state bisimilar to (M , s ) (but typically larger than in the previous construction, it now has size |M ⊗ M | instead of size |M |).
Axiomatization
We now give the axiomatization of the logic L 2⊗ . In Table  4 we only give the axioms involving action models. The ones for awareness after actions were presented in [22] and the one for implicit knowledge after action is novel, but has the standard shape of [1] . These are rewrite rules, that allow us to eliminate epistemic awareness action from formulas (given an innermost action model, one pushes it deeper and deeper into a formula until one of the first two axioms can be applied at which moment it has disappeared on the right-hand side). This proves the completeness of the axiomatization and the logic L 2⊗ is therefore also equally expressive as the logic of implicit knowledge L 2 . Proof. This follows from the following equivalences (embeddings). The first demonstrates that L 2⊗ < L E⊗ and the second (wherein we use a familiar equivalence, but now within the language This is an unmistakable though somewhat (we think) surprising result. Even though the logic of implicit knowledge is more expressive than the logic of explicit knowledge, the dynamic logic of implicit knowledge is equally expressive as the dynamic logic of explicit knowledge. And similarly for speculative knowledge. Example 5 clearly demonstrates the increase of expressive power when dynamics are added: all of a sudden we can distinguish the models (M, s) and (M , s)! To conclude the picture -and this paper -the axiomatization for the dynamic logic of explicit knowledge is therefore simply the one wherein you write K E i ϕ as 2iϕ ∧ Aiϕ and then derive that in L 2⊗ . This does not get us the axiomatization for the dynamic logic of speculative knowledge yet, a missing piece in this puzzle, but as the expressivity of this logic is now known, this seems of decidedly minor interest.
RELATED WORKS
Our epistemic awareness models are those of [4] . The language used there is L(2, K E , A), but it has the same expressivity as L(2, A), since K E i ϕ is definable as 2iϕ ∧ Aiϕ (see Proposition 20) . The setting of [4] is otherwise different. They assume the accessibility relations to be serial, transitive and euclidean (KD45). For the axiomatization one can simply add the characterizing axioms. The complete axiomatization provided there defines awareness Aip by abbreviation as
Another pertinent investigation is [9] . It focusses on axiomatizations, not on expressivity issues. In [9] , Halpern presents axiomatizations for the logics with languages L(2, A), L(K E , A) and L(K E ), for the model class where the (KD45) agents also know their own awareness: t ∈ Ri(s) implies Ai(s) = Ai(t). In the axiomatization for L(2, A) we find this as Aiϕ → 2iAiϕ and ¬Aiϕ → 2i¬Aiϕ. In the axiomatization for L(K E , A) this property is, instead, described by an axiom Aiϕ → K E i Aiϕ and a rule Irr.: "If no propositional variables in ϕ appear in ψ, then from ¬Aiϕ → ψ infer ψ" (with the suggestion that the rule might be derivable from the axiomatization). The rule Irr. is also discussed in [10] . These additional features seem to explain that the completeness proof for the logic of explicit knowledge in [9] is more involved than ours.
The language L(K E ) is shown in [9] to have the same expressivity as L(K E , A) but with the crucial difference that this is on models with euclidean accessibility relations and knowledge of awareness. In such models awareness can be defined in terms of explicit knowledge (as also done in [17] ):
We recall that in our approach Aϕ ↔ K E (ϕ∨¬ϕ) (similar to [4] , see above), but this equivalence does not hold on the more restricted model class.
Some recent studies on dynamics, such as [12, 8, 19 ] take a somewhat different approach to awareness, namely syntactic awareness, but employ similar ideas for the dynamics: updates of structures.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We have the described the logics of implicit, explicit, and speculative knowledge, related modal equivalence in these logics to different forms of bisimulation, compared their expressivity, and provided sound and complete axiomatizations. Then we investigated the dynamics of these logics, where we have shown that any conceivable change of knowledge or awareness can be modelled, we axiomatized the dynamic logic of implicit knowledge, and showed that all three dynamic logics are equally expressive.
Concerning further work, we wish to close some (we think) little gaps. The axiomatization of the logic of speculative knowledge with respect to S5 structures is not necessarily an extension of the current axiomatization. This is because the speculative knowledge operator has a built-in quantification over awareness bisimilar structures. Quantifying over structures in a more restricted model class therefore changes the semantics of speculative knowledge; and therefore, also its axiomatic properties. Another little gap is that, even though we know the expressivity of the dynamic logic of speculative knowledge, we do not have (as mentioned above) its axiomatization (with or without the S5 restriction).
Further ahead, there are alternative notions of knowledge beyond implicit / explicit / speculative that employ propositional awareness, for example: an agent knows a formula ϕ in state s iff in all accessible states t, ϕ is true and the agent is aware of ϕ (a version explored in [19] ). Or consider knowledge employing a recursive version of awareness: agent i is aware of K E i ϕ in s iff it is aware of ϕ in s and aware of ϕ in all t i-accessible from s. Alternative notions of knowledge would correspond to yet other notions of bisimulation.
The result of Theorem 38 that awareness action models can encode any form of knowledge and awareness change, is very strong. But from another perspective, it is also very weak, because typically only certain protocols or a given and commonly known set of actions are allowed. Investigating the dynamic logics of explicit and speculative knowledge for those settings may be relevant for game theory.
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